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I. INTRODUCTION
Eugene and Julia McMahon entered into a broker-customer
agreement with Shearson/American Express, Inc., in which Mary
Ann McNulty, a Shearson account manager, undertook the manage-
ment of certain investment accounts.' This agreement contained an
arbitration provision granting both parties the right to compel arbitra-
tion of claims brought by or against the other party.2 The McMahons
sued McNulty and Shearson in federal district court, alleging that
McNulty, with Shearson's knowledge and approval: traded exces-
sively, or "churned" the McMahons' joint account for the sole pur-
pose of maximizing commissions3 -a common law fraud violation;4
intentionally and recklessly made false statements and omitted
I. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 385 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), rev'd, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
2. The arbitration provision stated in part:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or
relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the
.breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in
effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., or the Boards of
Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock
Exchange, Inc. as I [the customer] may elect.
Id. at 385 (emphasis supplied by court).
3. Id. at 386.
4. Id. at 387.
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material facts when giving investment advice in violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and Rule lOb-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission;6 and engaged in a "pattern of
racketeering activity" in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' Pursuant to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act,8 Shearson moved to stay the district court proceedings
pending arbitration of the McMahons' claims. 9
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted Shearson's motion to compel arbitration of the
common law fraud and federal securities claims, but refused to com-
pel arbitration of the RICO claim.' ° The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order
compelling arbitration of the common law claims and denying arbi-
tration of the RICO claims, but reversed the district court's order
compelling arbitration of the federal securities claims. " The Supreme
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); see infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text. For the
relevant text of section 10(b), see infra note 39.
6. Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
7. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987). For the relevant text of this
statute, see infra note 52. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
8. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982); see infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
9. McMahon, 618 F. Supp. at 386. Shearson also moved, in the alternative, to dismiss the
amended complaint on the following grounds:
(1) failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.;
(2) lack of subject matter and pendent jurisdiction; (3) absence of an implied
private cause of action for alleged violation of the rules of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; (4)
failure to state a claim under RICO; and (5) unavailability of punitive damages.
Id.
10. Id. at 389. The district court, though acknowledging that the Second Circuit had
extended Wilko v. Swan to 1934 Act claims, held that such an extension was no longer proper
in light of two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). Id.
Thus, the court concluded that 1934 Act claims were arbitrable. The district court, however,
ruled that the RICO claims were not arbitrable "because of the important federal policies
inherent in the enforcement of RICO." Id. at 387. For a discussion of the arbitrability of
RICO claims, see infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
11. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), revd, 107
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Court of the United States held, reversed: Because the Federal Arbi-
tration Act favors rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements,
such predispute agreements1 2 between brokers and customers are
enforceable even if a customer's claim alleges a violation of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, or the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
This Note analyzes the conflict between Congress' support for
arbitration as evidenced by the Federal Arbitration Act, and the fed-
eral judiciary's reluctance to enforce predispute agreements to arbi-
trate claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the RICO Act. Section IIA of this Note
describes the origin of this conflict and the seminal case of Wilko v.
Swan, 3 in which a plaintiff brought a claim under the Securities Act
of 1933, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied the
defendant's motion to enforce the parties' predispute arbitration
agreement. Section IIB discusses application of the Wilko doctrine to
claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
RICO Act, and Section IIC describes the Supreme Court's movement
away from the Wilko doctrine. Section III focuses on the McMahon
decision, in which the Supreme Court held that Wilko's reasoning
does not govern claims brought under the 1934 Act or the RICO Act.
Section IV discusses the adequacy of arbitration as an alternative to
litigation. Section V argues that the Court's decision in McMahon
tacitly overruled Wilko, and that 1933 Act claims should therefore be
arbitrable. This Note concludes that it is proper to enforce predispute
arbitration agreements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the RICO Act, and the Securities Act of 1933.
S. Ct. 2332 (1987). The Second Circuit "decline[d] the invitation" to overrule its prior
extension of the Wilko doctrine to 1934 Act claims. Id. at 97. The court reasoned that,
"[a]lthough Scherk and Byrd may cast some doubt on whether the Supreme Court, if presented
with the issue, would hold claims under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to be non-arbitrable, it would
be improvident for us to disregard clear judicial precedent in this Circuit based on mere
speculation." Id. at 98.
The Second Circuit then chastised the district court for failing to follow stare decisis:
"We think that the orderly administration of justice will be best served if we as one of the
inferior courts follow Supreme Court precedent and adhere to the settled law of this Circuit,
and a fortiori the district courts should do likewise." Id.
12. Only predispute arbitration agreements were at issue in McMahon. There is no
question that an agreement to submit an existing dispute to arbitration is enforceable.
13. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
19871
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II. ARBITRATION OF SECURITIES CLAIMS UNDER Wilko v. Swan
A. The Federal Arbitration Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and the
Wilko Doctrine
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)14 in 1925 to
promote the use of arbitration as an alternative to litigation and to
overcome judicial hostility toward arbitration. 5 The FAA mandates
that all contractual agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."' 6 Upon the initiation of
a civil action between parties to an arbitration agreement, the FAA
requires both federal and state courts to stay judicial proceedings in
favor of arbitration upon the request of either party. 7 In addition, if
one party wishes to invoke a predispute arbitration provision before
filing a complaint, but the opposing party refuses to comply, the first
party may petition a United States district court for an order compel-
ling arbitration.' 8
The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA broadly, as evi-
denced by Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,' 9 in which the Court stated:
The FAA establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construc-
tion of the contract language itself or an alleged allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.2 °
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
15. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431-32 & n.12 (1953) (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924)); see Note,
Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1139-42
(1986) (a historical analysis of the Federal Arbitration Act).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
17. Section 3 of the FAA provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending ... shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). For a discussion of how this provision controls state courts, see infra
notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
18. Section 4 of the FAA provides that "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect,
or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), Mitsubishi invoked this provision of the
FAA by demanding arbitration of its dispute before either party had filed suit. See infra notes
83-93 and accompanying text.
19. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
20. Id. at 24-25. The Cone Memorial decision comports with the Court's earlier decision
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), in which the Court
[Vol. 42:203
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There is one general exception to Cone Memorial's holding: A
plaintiff may avoid a predispute arbitration agreement if he can prove
that Congress intended to create an exception to the FAA by enacting
a statute that provides some "special right" not generally available at
common law.2 The Supreme Court first articulated this "special
right" theory in Wilko v. Swan22 as the basis for its refusal to compel
arbitration of 1933 Act claims. Wilko had entered into a brokerage
agreement with Swan, a partner in a brokerage firm. The contract
contained a provision that all disputes between the parties would be
resolved through arbitration. After Wilko sued Swan, alleging mis-
representations and fraudulent inducement in violation of section
12(2) of the 1933 Act,23 Swan moved to compel arbitration, but the
district court denied Swan's motion.24  The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's order,
holding that the FAA mandated enforcement of all arbitration agree-
ments.25 Confronted with what it perceived to be a conflict between
the FAA and the Securities Act of 1933, the Supreme Court reversed
the Second Circuit, holding that an agreement to arbitrate future con-
troversies constitutes a binding waiver of the buyer's available reme-
dies in violation of section 14 of the 1933 Act.26
In so ruling, the Court reasoned that three unique aspects of sec-
compelled arbitration of a claim that the contract providing for the future arbitration of
disputes had itself been induced fraudulently. The Court reasoned that "[t]he question [of the
alleged fraudulent inducement of the contract] which Prima Paint requested the District Court
to adjudicate preliminarily to allowing arbitration to proceed is one not intended by Congress
to delay the granting of a § 3 stay." Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406-07.
21. The Supreme Court in McMahon declared that a party opposing enforcement of an
arbitration agreement must demonstrate congessional intent "discernible from the text,
history, or purposes of the statute," to overcome the presumption of arbitrability. McMahon,
107 S. Ct. at 2338. For a discussion of this "special right" in the context of the 1934 Act, see
infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
22. 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
23. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides in relevant part:
Any person who ... offers or sells'a security ... by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements ... not misleading ... and who shall not sustain
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue ... in any court of competent
jurisdiction ....
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
24. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.),
rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
25. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
26. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. For the text of section 14 of the 1933 Act, see infra note 30.
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tion 12(2) of the 1933 Act gave plaintiffs a "special right" not found
at common law which in effect overrode the arbitration agreement.27
First, under section 12(2), the buyer does not carry the burden of
proving the seller's scienter as required in a common law fraud action.
There is a rebuttable presumption under section 12(2) that the seller
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that
the information given to the buyer was inaccurate or incomplete. The
seller must overcome this presumption by proving his lack of scienter
to avoid liability.2" Second, a plaintiff has broad discretion in select-
ing a forum under the 1933 Act because both state and federal courts
have jurisdiction over section 12(2) claims, and a claim filed in state
court may not be removed to federal court.2 9 Finally, section 14 of the
1933 Act prohibits any agreement that would serve as a binding
waiver of compliance with any provision of the Act. 30 Though the
Wilko Court purportedly based its refusal to enforce the arbitration
agreement on its belief that such predispute arbitration agreements
constitute exactly the type of waiver proscribed by Congress in section
14, other factors played a key role in its decision. Central to the
Court's reasoning was the notion that arbitration is ill-suited to pro-
tect unwary buyers from unscrupulous sellers.3 ' Moreover, the Wilko
Court contended that Congress specifically designed this "special
right" to reduce the disparity in bargaining power between buyers and
sellers inherent in the open securities market:
[I]t is clear that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the
disadvantages under which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers in
securities have better opportunities to investigate and appraise the
prospective earnings and business plans affecting securities than
buyers. It is therefore reasonable for Congress to put buyers of
securities covered by that Act on a different basis from other
purchasers.32
The Court recognized that the FAA promoted important public
policy goals by providing "an opportunity ... to secure prompt, eco-
nomical and adequate [re]solution of controversies. ' 33 The Court
27. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430-33.
28. Id. at 431 & n.10.
29. Id. at 431. The Wilko Court recognized that "[tihe Act's special right is enforceable in
any court of competent jurisdiction-federal or state-and removal from a state court is
prohibited." Id.
30. Section 14 of the 1933 Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
31. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-37.
32. Id. at 435.
33. Id. at 438.
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concluded, however, that Congress' deep concern for protecting
investors, as evidenced by the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,
was superior to its concern for the expeditious resolution of
disputes."
B. Application of the Wilko Doctrine to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the RICO Act
The Wilko Court addressed solely the conflict between the Secur-
ities Act of 1933 and the FAA; it did not decide whether courts could
compel arbitration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
overwhelming majority of courts confronted with this issue, however,
have concluded that the Wilko rationale applies to 1934 Act cases.35
In Wolfe v. E.F Hutton & Co., 36 for example, the Eleventh Circuit
held that claims brought under the 1934 Act, like those brought
under the 1933 Act, could not be compelled to arbitration.37 The
Wolfe court articulated four reasons for its decision. First, the court
noted that the Supreme Court had had ample opportunity to limit the
Wilko doctrine to 1933 Act claims, but had never done so. 38 Second,
the Wolfe court discussed the similarity between a section 12(2) claim
under the 1933 Act and a section 10(b) claim under the 1934 Act,39
34. Id. Courts have followed this reasoning unwaveringly in subsequent attempts to
compel arbitration of section 12(2) claims. See, e.g., Tashea v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1337, 1338 (lth Cir. 1986).
35. See Benoay v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 1437 (1Ith Cir. 1986); Tashea v.
Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 802 F.2d 1337 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 800 F.2d 1032 (1 1th Cir. 1986); McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d
94 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987); AFP Imaging Corp. v. Ross, 780 F.2d 202 (2d
Cir. 1985); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir.
1982); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977);
see generally Hoellering, Arbitrability of Disputes, 41 Bus. LAW. 125 (1985); Krantz, May &
Cohen, The Sixth Circuit and the Securities Laws.- A Survey of Decisions from 1983 through
1985, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 549 (1986); Schaller & Schaller, Applying the Wilko Doctrine's Anti-
Arbitration Policy in Commodities Fraud Cases, 61 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 515, 530-33 (1985).
36. 800 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1986).
37. Id. at 1038.
38. Id. at 1034-35; see Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)
(compelling arbitration of state claims, but refusing to decide the question of arbitrability of
1934 Act claims); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (enforcing the arbitration
of 1934 Act claims, but limiting its holding to international transactions).
39. Section 10(b) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules ... as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Compare this language with that of section 12(2), which is provided
supra note 23.
1987]
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reasoning that both sections provide plaintiffs with a "special right."4
The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that a sec-
tion 10(b) plaintiff must prove scienter, which is not an element of a
section 12(2) claim.4" Third, the Wolfe court recognized that the pri-
vate cause of action given to buyers vis-a-vis sellers is expressly pro-
vided in the 1933 Act,4 2 but only implied in the 1934 Act. The court,
however, found little significance in this distinction.43 Further, the
court asserted that even if the implied right in the 1934 Act was less
"special," this difference is insignificant when analyzed in conjunction
with the 1934 Act's exclusive federal jurisdiction provision."
Regardless of the express/implied distinction, therefore, Congress
manifested its intention to give plaintiffs greater protection under the
1934 Act than in the 1933 Act by permitting only federal courts to
hear 1934 Act claims, which in effect prohibited arbitration of such
40. The Wolfe court explained:
The purpose of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is the same: "to protect investors" by
requiring "full and fair disclosure" in connection with securities transactions.
One act concerns itself with the issuance of securities and the other with post-
issuance transactions, but that does not suggest that they should be treated
differently with respect to arbitration .... [Although a lOb-5 plaintiff, unlike a
12(2) plaintiff, must prove scienter], nevertheless, the lOb-5 action is also a
special one unknown at common law.
Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1035-36 (citations omitted).
41. Compare the text of section 12(2), which is provided supra note 23, with the text of
section 10(b), which is provided supra note 39.
42. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act expressly provides for the buyer's cause of action against
the seller: "[The seller] shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who
may sue ... in any court of competent jurisdiction ...." 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982) (emphasis
added).
43. Section 10 of the 1934 Act merely states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
.... 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). This language does not expressly give the buyer of securities a
cause of action against the seller. The federal courts, however, have determined that the
statute implicitly gives a buyer the right to bring an action for violation of section 10(b). See
Kardon v. National Gypsum, 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ("[The 1934 Act] does not
even provide in express terms for a remedy, although the existence of a remedy is implicit
under general principles of the law.").
In a concurring opinion in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, Justice White argued that
the 1933 Act expressly provides plaintiffs a private right of action and the discretion to choose
between a state or federal forum, while the 1934 Act merely implies a private right of action,
and that therefore, a plaintiff's rights are less "special" under the 1934 Act. 470 U.S. 213, 224-
25 (1985) (White, J., concurring); see infra notes 81-82, 149-52 and accompanying text.
44. Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides in relevant part:
The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
For a discussion of the exclusive federal jurisdiction provision in the 1934 Act as it affects
state court jurisdiction, see generally Note, The Securities Exchange Act and the Rule of Exclu-
sive Federal Jurisdiction, 89 YALE L.J. 95 (1979).
ARBITRATION OF SECURITIES CLAIMS
disputes.45 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit referred to the 1975 amend-
ments of the 1934 Act in which Congress "specifically permitt[ed]
compulsory arbitration of securities claims between securities profes-
sionals," but declared that the amendment was to have no effect on
the Wilko decision. 46 The court concluded that Congress, while con-
sidering the amendments, was aware of the many decisions extending
the Wilko doctrine to 1934 Act claims and approved of that
extension..
Judge Tjoflat, in his Wolfe concurrence, made perhaps the sim-
plest and strongest argument in favor of treating arbitration of 1934
Act claims in the same manner as 1933 Act claims. Judge Tjoflat
noted the similarity between section 14 of the 1933 Act,48 and section
29 of the 1934 Act,49 both of which provide that any agreement to
waive compliance with the respective Acts is void. Judge Tjoflat
argued:
Absent section 14 [of the Securities Act of 1933] the agreement to
arbitrate [in Wilko] would have been enforceable pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act ....
The 1934 Act contains a provision [section 29] that is nearly
identical to section 14 of the 1933 Act .... Under the teaching of
Wilko, therefore, we must conclude that section 29 of the 1934 Act
overrides the Federal Arbitration Act and renders unenforceable
agreements to arbitrate 1934 Act disputes.5°
The similarity between these two provisions is the most commonly
espoused justification for extending Wilko to 1934 Act claims.5
45. The Wolfe court explained:
The 1934 Act provides that the federal courts are to have "exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this chapter . . . and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter ...." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1982). This sweeping language applies to all actions brought under the
1934 Act, including implied actions such as the lOb-5 action. Regardless of
whether the lob-5 action itself is considered a "provision of this chapter," the
exclusive jurisdiction provision is undisputably such a "provision," which, under
the Wilko rationale, should not be considered waivable.
Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1036.
46. Id. at 1037 (citing H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, 111, reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 321); see infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
47. Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1037.
48. Section 14 of the 1933 Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
49. Section 29 of the 1934 Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc
(1982).
50. Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1039 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
51. See, e.g., McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d at 96-97 ("[T]he
1987]
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Although there is no comparable provision in the RICO Act5 2
prohibiting the waiver of statutory rights as exists in section 14 of the
1933 Act and section 29 of the 1934 Act,5 3 courts have nevertheless
held civil RICO claims to be nonarbitrable.5 4 In S.A. Mineracao Da
Trindade-Samitri v. Utah International Inc.," for example, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that RICO claims cannot be compelled to arbitration because
racketeering activity has a substantial national impact:
[RICO's] enforcement involves concerns touching upon vital
national interests. Although RICO claims may be brought by pri-
vate individuals, the resolution of such claims will frequently have
an impact on society at large. The Court must infer that Congress
did not intend to entrust the enforcement of such laws to arbitra-
tors, and consequently .. .claims asserted under RICO are not
arbitrable. 6
non-waiver provision of § 14 of the 1933 Act has an almost identical counterpart in § 29(a) of
the 1934 Act.").
52. The RICO Act prohibits involvement in a "pattern of racketeering activity," as well as
the use or investment of money derived from such "activity." 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968
(West 1984 & Supp. 1987). The heart of the RICO Act is contained in section 1962, which
states in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use
or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in .. .interstate or foreign commerce.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity ... to acquire or maintain ... any interest in or control of any enterprise
which is engaged in ... interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity ....
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (West 1984).
The RICO Act provides both criminal penalties and civil remedies. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1963-
1964 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987). Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear claims arising under
the Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965 (West 1984).
53. See supra text accompanying note 50.
54. See, e.g., Smokey Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 785 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1986); Universal Marine Ins. Co. v. Beacon Ins. Co., 588 F.
Supp. 735 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
55. 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y.. 1984).
56. Id. at 575. The Mineracao court constructed its "vital national interests" theory from
decisions prohibiting the arbitration of claims brought under the Sherman Act and the
Bankruptcy Act. Id; see Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1977); American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). For a discussion of
these cases, see infra note 90.
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Surprisingly, most courts that have considered the arbitrability
of civil RICO claims have mechanically accepted this rationale with-
out debate.17 At least one court, however, questioned the wisdom of
barring the arbitration of civil RICO claims. Recognizing that there
is no antiwaiver provision in the RICO Act, and that federal jurisdic-
tion is not exclusive in the RICO Act as in the 1934 Act,58 the Elev-
enth Circuit in Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.5 9
observed that "whether a RICO claim is a 'non-arbitrable, federal
claim' is an open question in this circuit."6
C. The Movement Away from the Wilko Doctrine
The first indication that the Supreme Court was beginning to
look unfavorably upon the Wilko doctrine came in the context of an
international arbitration agreement.61 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co. ,62 an American company sued a German citizen, alleging misrep-
resentations in connection with the transfer of trademark rights in
violation of the 1934 Act. The United States district court, applying
the Wilko doctrine, denied Scherk's motion to compel arbitration of
the 1934 Act claims.63 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 64 In its decision reversing the Seventh Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court came very close to rejecting application of
the Wilko doctrine to 1934 Act disputes:
[A] colorable argument could be made that even the semantic rea-
soning of the Wilko opinion does not control the case before us.
Wilko concerned a suit brought under § 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933 .... There is no statutory counterpart of § 12(2) in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... [T]he [1934] Act itself does
not establish the "special right" that the Court in Wilko found
significant.65
57. See cases cited supra note 54.
58. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) ("district courts of the United States ... shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter") (emphasis added) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965
(West 1984) ("Any civil action ... under this chapter... may be instituted in the district court
of the United States") (emphasis added).
59. 763 F.2d 1352 (1lth Cir. 1985).
60. Id. at 1361. See generally Note, Another Hurdle Remains for Civil RICO Plaintiffs.
Will a Predispute Arbitration Agreement Bar RICO Plaintiffs from a Federal Forum?, 6 J. L. &
CoM. 283 (1986).
61. See McMahon, 618 F. Supp. at 338 ("The Supreme Court . . . first expressed
reservations about the propriety of applying Wilko to claims arising under the 1934 Act in
Scherk.").
62. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
63. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 612 (7th Cir. 1973). rev'd, 417 U.S. 506
(1974).
64. Id.
65. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14.
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The Court decided that the 1934 Act claims presented in Scherk
were indeed arbitrable, but limited its holding to Scherk's interna-
tional context. The Court reasoned that regardless of Wilko's applica-
bility to Scherk, "[a] parochial refusal by the courts of one country to
enforce an international arbitration agreement" would destroy the
integrity of international transactions.66 The Scherk Court never
reached the question of arbitrability of domestic 1934 Act claims.
The Supreme Court further restricted the applicability of the
Wilko doctrine in Southland Corp. v. Keating.67 Keating had brought
a class action suit in the Superior Court of California on behalf of
approximately 800 Southland franchisees, alleging that Southland had
violated the disclosure requirements of California's Franchise Invest-
ment Law. 68 The lower court granted Southland's motion to compel
arbitration. 69 The Supreme Court of California reversed the lower
court, holding that the California Code prohibits any agreement that
allows a plaintiff to waive his rights under the Investment Law.7 ° In
deciding Keating, the Supreme Court of California followed Wilko
because of the similarity between the Investment Law's antiwaiver
provision and section 14 of the 1933 Act,7 reasoning that compelled
arbitration of an Investment Law claim would indeed deprive the
plaintiff of rights granted by the Investment Law. 72  The Supreme
Court of the United States, however, noted that the supremacy clause
of the Constitution of the United States mandates that federal sub-
stantive law prevail over conflicting state law. 73  Holding that the
Supreme Court of California's decision was in direct conflict with the
FAA, which is substantive (rather than procedural) federal law, the
66. Id. at 517.
67. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
68. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982).
69. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 855.
70. Section 31512 of the California Code provides: "Any condition, stipulation or
provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any
provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void." CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512
(West 1977).
71. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
72. Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 597-98, 645 P.2d at 1198-99, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67.
One author noted that the California court in Keating "found that since the California
legislature had modeled the state's Franchise Investment Act after the Securities Act of 1933,
then it must have intended the law to be interpreted in accordance with federal court decisions
under the Securities Act of 1933." Note, Federal Preemption-Arbitration-Federal
Arbitration Act Creates National Substantive Law Applicable in Federal and State Courts and
Supercedes Contrary State Statutes, 54 Miss. L.J. 571, 572 n.9 (1984).
73. The supremacy clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Cali-
fornia court and ordered arbitration of the dispute.7 4
In Southland, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its support for arbi-
tration as an alternative to litigation. Although the Court predicated
its decision upon the supremacy of federal substantive law over state
law, Southland also cast doubt upon the effectiveness of antiwaiver
provisions, such as those found in the California Franchise Invest-
ment Law and section 14 of the 1933 Act (upon which the Wilko
doctrine is premised).75
The Court abolished another obstacle to arbitration one year
later in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd.76 Dr. Byrd had entered
into a brokerage agreement in which Dean Witter agreed to manage
$160,000 in securities derived from the sale of Dr. Byrd's dental prac-
tice. This agreement contained an industry-standard arbitration pro-
vision. 77 After Byrd's account lost over $100,000 in one six-month
period, Byrd sued Dean Witter alleging common law fraud and viola-
tions of the 1934 Act. Dean Witter moved to compel arbitration of
the common law claim, but the district court denied the motion, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 78 Both the district court and the Ninth
Circuit noted that the federal and common law claims were so "inter-
twined" that arbitration of the common law claims followed by fed-
eral court review of the federal claims would be costly, inefficient, and
would eliminate any possible value that arbitration might otherwise
offer.79 The Supreme Court, however, rejected these arguments and
reversed the Ninth Circuit's order. The Court insisted that arbitra-
tion agreements must be enforced even if their enforcement results in
bifurcated proceedings:
74. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 17; see Buchanan & Stevenson, Developments in
Litigation and Enforcement Under State Securities Laws, 40 Bus. LAW. 705, 718 (1985)
("[T]he Federal Arbitration Act [is] substantive federal law which is enforceable in state as
well as federal courts... [and] preempts the antiwaiver ofjudicial remedies provision found in
many blue sky acts.").
75. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
76. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
77. Id. at 215. The arbitration provision stated in part: "Any controversy between you
and the undersigned arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration." Id.
78. Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470 U.S. 213
(1985).
79. Additionally, the lower courts believed that allowing arbitration of the state claims
would impair a subsequent federal trial because the federal court would be bound by the
arbitrators findings of fact under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221-22;
see generally Note, Investor-Broker Arbitration Agreements.- Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 101 (1985); Note, Federal and State Securities Claims: Litigation or
Arbitration?-Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 61 WASH. L. REV. 245 (1986).
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The legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose
behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately
made agreements to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion
that the overriding goal of the Federal Arbitration Act was to pro-
mote the expeditious resolution of claims. The Act, after all does
not mandate the arbitration of all claims, but merely the enforce-
ment . . . of privately negotiated arbitration agreements. The
House Report accompanying the Act makes clear that its purpose
was to place an arbitration agreement "upon the same footing as
other contracts, where it belongs."'
The Court ordered arbitration of the common law claims, but
refused to consider the arbitrability of the federal securities claims
because the parties had not properly presented the question to the
Court." In a concurring opinion, Justice White agreed that the ques-
tion was not before the Court, but argued that the Wilko doctrine was
not necessarily applicable to 1934 Act claims. He contended that
Congress provided plaintiffs with a more "special" right in the 1933
Act than in the 1934 Act, and that 1934 Act claims might be arbitra-
ble. He acknowledged, however, that "the question remains open."82
In its last consideration of the Wilko doctrine prior to McMahon,
the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc. 83 discussed the arbitrability of federal antitrust claims in the
context of yet another international dispute. Mitsubishi, a Japanese
automobile manufacturer, had entered into a sales agreement with
Soler, a Puerto Rican automobile distributor and dealer. The agree-
ment required arbitration by the Japanese Commercial Arbitration
Association of all disputes arising under the contract.8 4 After a dis-
pute arose between the parties over the sale and shipment of new cars,
Mitsubishi brought an action in federal district court seeking an order
to compel arbitration. The district court ordered arbitration of all
claims, including an antitrust claim.8 5 On appeal, the First Circuit
reversed, holding that antitrust claims are not arbitrable.86 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the First Circuit, ruling that anti-
trust claims brought under the Sherman Act are arbitrable; but as in
80. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)).
81. Dean Witter, assuming that all federal securities claims (including 1934 Act claims)
were not arbitrable under Wilko, moved to compel arbitration of the common law claims only.
Id. at 217.
82. Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring); see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
83. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
84. Id. at 617.
85. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 157 (1st Cir.
1983), rev'd, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
86. Id.
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Scherk,87 the Court limited its holding to Mitsubishi's international
context.8" The Court refused to overturn American Safety Equipment
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,89 which held that antitrust claims are
generally not arbitrable because of the public's vital interest in fully
litigating such disputes.90 Despite this refusal, 91 the Mitsbushi deci-
sion certainly reads as a general endorsement of arbitration:
[A]daptability and access . . .are hallmarks of arbitration. The
87. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
88. The Mitsubishi Court admitted that the result may have been different in a domestic
dispute:
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes
require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
89. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
90. In American Safety, the Second Circuit questioned the arbitrability of domestic federal
antitrust claims. American Safety had sought to avoid a license agreement with Hickok on the
grounds that it violated the Sherman Act. Maguire, Hickok's assignee of royalty rights, moved
to compel arbitration of the dispute as provided in their agreement. The court ,denied
Maguire's motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that Congress intended the judicial system
to resolve disputes brought under the Sherman Act. Id. at 828.
The American Safety court had four basic reasons for its decision. First, because antitrust
violations can affect the public at large, the private right of action under the Sherman Act is
like "a private attorney-general who protects the public's interest," and that public interest is
not adequately protected by arbitration. Id. at 826 (citing Waldron v. Cities Serv. Co., 361
F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1966)). Second, arbitration agreements are usually found only in
adhesion contracts. Third, antitrust claims are usually quite complex and arbitrators generally
are not sophisticated enough in the area of antitrust to resolve such disputes properly. Fourth,
because of their business expertise, many arbitrators may possess a natural bias in favor of big
business; it would seem inappropriate, therefore, for these arbitrators to determine issues of
such great public interest. 1d; see Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims. The
Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REV. 219 (1986)
(discussing seven additional reasons that commentators have offered in support of this
decision).
Courts also have used the "vital national interest" theory to explain why bankruptcy
claims are not arbitrable. Relying on American Safety, for example, the Second Circuit
expanded its arbitration prohibition to include bankruptcy claims in Allegaert v. Perot, 548
F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1977). Allegaert, trustee for the bankrupt Walston, sued Perot to enjoin a
realignment plan that allegedly would have resulted in preferential treatment for Perot. Perot
moved to enforce an arbitration agreement that he and Walston had executed. The court
denied the motion for two primary reasons: First, the Bankruptcy Act, like the Sherman Act,
presents important federal questions that Congress did not intend to be arbitrable; and second,
the existence of the federal securities claims, not arbitrable under Wilko, supports judicial
resolution of the bankruptcy claims to avoid duplicate proceedings. Id. at 436-38. The court
also reasoned that even if an enforceable arbitration agreement had existed between Perot and
Walston, it would not bind Allegaert because a trustee in bankruptcy stands in the shoes of the
creditors and not in the shoes of the bankrupt. Id. at 436.
Although Allegaert is the leading case on the question of the arbitrability of bankruptcy
disputes, this issue is by no means settled. See Deitrick, The Conflicting Policies Between
Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 40 Bus. LAW. 33, 41 (1984) ("Should arbitration clauses be
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anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account
when the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral rules typically pro-
vide for the participation of experts .... [T]he factor of potential
complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral tribunal
could not properly handle an antitrust matter.
92
The Mitsubishi Court, therefore, undermined the very foundation of
the Wilko doctrine by concluding that arbitration is an adequate (if
not preferred) alternative to litigation. 93
The Mitsubishi decision is the product of a series of cases that
began with Scherk, in which the Supreme Court demonstrated its sup-
port for arbitration and foreshadowed its refusal to extend Wilko to
1934 Act and RICO Act claims.94 The federal courts of appeals,
however, were reluctant to follow this trend, choosing instead to cling
to Wilko. 95 In contrast, many district courts anticipated McMahon by
enforcing arbitration agreements in 1934 Act and RICO disputes.96
The Supreme Court's McMahon decision put an end to the guessing
game and established a uniform treatment of such claims in the fed-
eral courts. 97
mandatorily enforced by bankruptcy courts? The Eighth Circuit seems to think so, but the
Third and Sixth Circuits do not.").
Furthermore, courts have used the "vital national interest" theory to argue that RICO
claims are not arbitrable. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
91. The Mitsubishi Court stated simply that "it [is] unnecessary to access the legitimacy of
the American Safety doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic
transactions." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
92. Id. at 633-34. However, Justice Stevens in a dissenting opinion expressed his view that
courts should never compel any federal claims to arbitration, including those under the
Sherman Act. Reading the FAA closely, Stevens concluded that the Act requires arbitration
of claims arising out of the parties' contract-not claims arising under federal statutes. Id. at
646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. See infra notes 126-45 and accompanying text.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 98-116.
95. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 815 F.2d 655 (11th Cir.
1987); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986);
Tashea v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 802 F.2d 1337 (1 1th Cir. 1986). But see Smokey
Greenhaw Cotton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir.
1986).
96. See Intre Sport, Ltd. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 92,714 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1986); Shamir v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1986
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,511 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1986); Arent v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., [1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,523
(D. Mass. Dec. 20, 1985); Bateh v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., No. 84-526-CIV-J-14
(M.D. Fla. July 29, 1985); Ackerman v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., No. 84-6739-CIV-
Hastings (S.D. Fla. May 15, 1985); Finn v. Davis, 610 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
97. See Nesslage v. York Securities, Inc., 823 F.2d 231, 235 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[Flollowing
the Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/American Express, we hold that § 10(b)/Rule lOb-5
claims are arbitrable [and] civil RICO claims are arbitrable.").
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III. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon: PREDISPUTE
AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE EXCHANGE ACT AND
RICO ACT CLAIMS ARE ENFORCEABLE
The Supreme Court in McMahon answered the question that Jus-
tice White referred to as "open" in Byrd:8 Wilko does not extend to
1934 Act and RICO Act claims, and therefore, such claims are arbi-
trable if a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties.99
The McMahon Court, however, did not expressly overrule Wilko.10°
Rather, the Court assumed arguendo that Wilko was decided cor-
rectly and that 1933 Act claims cannot be compelled to arbitration.''
The McMahon Court, in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor,
began its analysis with a discussion of the Federal Arbitration Act.'
The Court noted that section 2 of the FAA requires enforcement of a
written arbitration provision in any "contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce.' 0 3 The Court also recognized that Con-
gress intended that the FAA "[reverse] centuries of judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements' and reduce the cost and delay inherent
in litigation. 05 Moreover, the Court noted that subsequent judicial
decisions have required an expansive interpretation of the FAA. 106
The McMahon Court concluded, therefore, that the FAA creates a
presumption that private contracts to arbitrate disputes are enforcea-
ble."0 7 In order to overcome this presumption of arbitrability, the
Court declared that the moving party must "demonstrate that Con-
gress intended to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for claims
arising under RICO and the Exchange Act, an intention discernible
from the text, history, or purposes of the statute."'0 8
The McMahon Court ruled that the requisite congressional intent
to overcome the presumption of arbitrability is not present in the 1934
Act. 10 9 The respondents had argued that 1934 Act claims were not
arbitrable because section 27 gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
and section 29 prohibits a plaintiff from waiving compliance with the
98. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
99. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
100. For the proposition that the Supreme Court tacitly overruled Wilko, see infra text
accompanying notes 146-55.
101. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338-39.
102. Id. at 2337.
103. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
104. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337 (quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510).
105. McMahon, 618 F. Supp. at 386 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-1,1).
106. See Cone Memorial, 460 U.S. at 25; see also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
107. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337.
108. Id. at 2338.
109. Id. at 2343-44.
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Act." ° The McMahon Court rejected this contention, pointing out
that a predispute agreement to arbitrate a future claim does not waive
compliance with any substantive aspect of the 1934 Act."' Rather,
this type of agreement merely waives a procedural component of the
Act that gives federal courts jurisdiction over 1934 Act disputes."
2
Such a procedural waiver is not contemplated in section 29.' 13
The McMahon Court also rejected the respondents' argument
that Congress' reference to Wilko in a report accompanying a 1975
amendment to the 1934 Act indicated Congress' knowledge and
approval of the various judicial decisions extending Wilko to 1934
Act claims.' 14 In that 1975 amendment, Congress modified section 28
of the 1934 Act to allow arbitration agreements between securities
professionals. Although this bill did not address the broker-customer
relationship, the Conference Report stated: "It was the clear under-
standing of the conferees that this amendment did not change existing
law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, . . . concerning the effect of
arbitration proceedings provisions in agreements entered into by
persons dealing with members and participants of self-regulatory
organizations.""' 5  The McMahon Court acknowledged that the
respondents' interpretation of the report was plausible, but noted that
it was equally plausible that Congress intended the opposite effect:
110. See Brief for Respondents at 13, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107
S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (No. 86-44) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief]; see also supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.
111. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
112. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2339. Judge Tjoflat noted in his Wolfe concurrence:
Were I writing on a clean slate, I might well be inclined to reach a result
contrary to the Wilko Court. Section 14 of the 1933 Act renders void any
provision binding a security purchaser to "waive compliance with any provision
of this subchapter."... A fair reading of this statute would prevent a purchaser
from waiving a seller's compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act
... . By agreeing to arbitrate, the purchaser does not waive the Act's
protections, but merely agrees to enforce the Act's provisions in a forum other
than the courts.
Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1039 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
113. The McMahon Court explained:
What the antiwaiver provision of § 29(a) forbids is enforcement of agreements to
waive "compliance" with the provisions of the statute. But § 27 itself does not
impose any duty with which persons trading in securities must "comply." By its
terms, § 29(a) only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations imposed by the
Exchange Act. Because § 27 does not impose any statutory duties, its waiver
does not constitute a waiver of "compliance with any provision" of the Exchange
Act under § 29(a).
McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338 (1987).
114. Respondents' Brief, supra note 110, at 18.
115. H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, 111, reprinted in, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 179, 321.
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Congress may have been approving the decisions that limited Wilko
to the 1933 Act. Indeed, the majority of the Court remained, uncon-
vinced that one sentence from a Conference Report, unaccompanied
by any affirmative legislative action, could overturn the clear language
in section 29 of the 1934 Act. 1 6
Four Justices dissented as to the 1934 Act portion of the opinion.
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall joined,
agreed with the respondents' contention that Congress had, in effect,
legislated Wilko into the 1934 Act:
[If] there could have been any doubts about the extension of
Wilko's holding to § 10(b) claims, they were undermined by Con-
gress in its 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act .... [I]n enact-
ing these amendments, Congress specifically was considering
exceptions to § 29(a) [the antiwaiver provision], designed with the
protection of investors in mind. The statement from the legislative
history ... indicates that Congress did not want the amendments
to overrule Wilko. Moreover, the fact that this statement was
made in an amendment to the Exchange Act suggests that Con-
gress was aware of the extension of Wilko to § 10(b) claims."
17
The arbitrability of RICO claims was a much easier issue for the
McMahon Court. All nine Justices agreed that, even if the respon-
dents' 1934 Act statutory arguments regarding the antiwaiver provi-
sion118 and exclusive federal jurisdiction provision' had merit, there
are no analagous provisions in the RICO Act upon which the respon-
dents could rely. The RICO Act contains no antiwaiver provision,
and the RICO Act's jurisdiction provision does not specify that fed-
eral courts will have exclusive jurisdiction. 20 Indeed, the Supreme
116. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor reasoned:
We cannot see how Congress could extend Wilko to the Exchange Act without
enacting into law any provision remotely addressing that subject. . . . [T]he
committee may.well have mentioned Wilko for a reason entirely different from
the one postulated by the McMahons-[e.g., because] lower courts had applied
§ 28(b) to the Securities Act [of 1933], . . . the committee may simply have
wished to make clear that the amendment to § 28(b) was not otherwise intended
to affect Wilko's construction of the Securities Act .... Finally, [the conferees]
specifically disclaimed any intent to change [the existing law]. Hence, the Wilko
issue was left to the courts: it was unaffected by the amendment to § 28(b). This
statement of congressional inaction simply does not support the proposition that
the 1975 Congress intended to engraft onto unamended § 29(a) a meaning
different from that of the enacting Congress.
McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2343.
117. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2347-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982). For the relevant text of section 29, see supra note 49.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). For the relevant text of section 27, see supra note 44.
120. Section 1965 of the RICO Act provides in relevant part that "[a]ny civil action or
proceeding under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the
19871
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Court stated that "there is nothing in the text of the RICO statute
that even arguably evinces congressional intent to exclude civil RICO
claims from the dictates of the Arbitration Act."'' 21 The Court also
rejected the respondents' theory that RICO claims, like bankruptcy
and antitrust claims, 122 present "important federal questions" that
should only be resolved in a judicial forum.'2 a The Court stated:
The special incentives necessary to encourage civil enforcement
actions against organized crime do not support nonarbitrability
[of] run-of-the-mill civil RICO claims brought against legitimate
enterprises. The private attorney general role for the typical RICO
plaintiff is simply less plausible than it is for the typical antitrust
plaintiff, and does not support a finding that there is an irreconcila-
ble conflict between arbitration and enforcement of the RICO
statute. 1
24
This display of unanimity on the part of the Supreme Court
leaves no room for debate-Civil RICO disputes are clearly arbitrable
if a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties.
1 25
IV. THE ADEQUACY OF ARBITRATION
One theme that pervades the McMahon decision is the belief that
arbitration provides both plaintiffs and defendants with an adequate
forum for resolving their disputes. 126 This view, though consistent
with the congressional intent behind the FAA,'2 7 is at odds with
many of the traditional objections to the arbitration of securities
claims. Those opposed to arbitration generally have based their objec-
tions on the following myths: First, arbitration agreements are adhe-
sion contracts and the investor has little or no bargaining power;
second, arbitration is the broker's "home court" because the arbitra-
tor is biased in favor of the securities industry; third, the lack of ade-
quate discovery and evidentiary proceedings in arbitration operates to
United States for any district in which such person resides." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965 (West 1984)
(emphasis added).
121. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
122. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
123. See Respondents' Brief, supra note 110, at 42.
124. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2345; see Brief for Petitioners at 28-33, Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (No. 86-44) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
The "important federal question" or "vital national interest" theory is flawed in two
respects: First, only mob-type RICO violations present the type of public intrusion that are so
important as to require judicial resolution; and second, every piece of legislation protects an
important national interest-otherwise Congress presumably would not have passed the given
statute.
125. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2345-46.
126. Id. at 2340-41.
127. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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the disadvantage of the investor; fourth, the arbitrator is likely to be
inexperienced or unsophisticated compared to a judge; and fifth, the
lack of an adequate record of the proceedings and the absence of ade-
quate judicial review impairs the investor's ability to enforce or appeal
an arbitrator's award.
18
Although these concerns may have been legitimate at the time of
the Wilko decision, they no longer are valid. In fact, one can easily
dispel each of the five myths. 129 First, some brokers (especially dis-
count brokers) do not require predispute arbitration agreements. The
investor, therefore, has substantial bargaining power with brokers
because he can demand the removal of an arbitration clause from the
brokerage contract, and if the broker refuses, the investor is free to
walk out the door and find a broker willing to forgo the arbitration
provision. 3 ° Second, the investor usually may choose from a list of
arbitration organizations, some of which have no connection to the
securities industry, such as the American Arbitration Association.'
In addition, if the arbitration contract requires the use of a panel of
arbitrators, the investor may insist that a majority of the panel come
from outside the securities industry, and each party will usually have
one peremptory challenge in the selection of an arbitrator. 132 Third,
the rules of arbitration permit the parties to subpoena witnesses and
allow limited discovery and evidentiary hearings. 33 In fact, this limit
on discovery is often beneficial to the investor because he is not bur-
dened with the substantial expense often associated with discovery in
a judicial proceeding; i.e., the brokerage firm cannot bury the investor
with paperwork.' 34 Fourth, the arbitrator is likely to be more knowl-
128. Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 445-55 (1987) (describing and dispelling the "myths"
surrounding arbitration).
129. Id; see also Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 279 (1984) (Constantine Katsoris, a member of SICA, the Arbitration Committee of
National Association of Securities Dealers, and an experienced New York Stock Exchange
arbitrator, provides a detailed description of the arbitration of securities claims.).
130. See Fletcher, supra note 128, at 447.
131. For a description of the American Arbitration Association's contributions to securities
arbitration, see Brief for the American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 12-21, Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987)
(No. 86-44) [hereinafter Brief for the American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae]. In
addition, the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) has proposed further
refinement of the arbitral process with the adoption of the Uniform Code of Arbitration. See
Petitioners' Brief, supra note 124, at 34-35.
132. Id. at 448; see infra notes 156-57.
133. See Brief for the American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae, supra note 131,
at App. B.
134. See Fletcher, supra note 128, at 453.
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edgeable in his area of specialization than the average judge. 35 Also,
to ensure that the parties' interests are protected adequately and the
arbitrator is fully apprised of the parties' respective legal positions,
arbitration rules generally entitle all parties to have counsel pres-
ent. 1 36 Finally, arbitration rules usually require written awards, and
any party may request a stenographer to keep a record of the proceed-
ing.' 37 If a party refuses to comply with the arbitrator's award, the
other party may seek enforcement of the award in a judicial proceed-
ing. If one party believes that the arbitrator has abused his discretion,
that party may petition a court to modify or vacate the award. 38
Resolving disputes in arbitration actually has many advan-
tages. 39 The average arbitration hearing is faster and less costly than
the average judicial proceeding. Thus, arbitration provides a means
of reducing the time, expense and emotional stress that are natural
consequences of the litigation process. 40 There is greater privacy in
arbitration, as well as a lower level of intensity that preserves good
will between the parties.' 4 ' Because the standard of review for an
arbitrator's ruling is limited to instances in which he abuses his discre-
tion, the arbitrator's decision will have greater certainty and finality
than that of a judge. 42
Moreover, the crowded court dockets provide another compel-
ling reason to encourage arbitration. A court's refusal to enforce an
arbitration agreement causes a domino effect, delaying not only the
parties denied arbitration, but all parties on the docket who must wait
that much longer for their day in court.
Cooperation between arbitrators and the judiciary could play a
large role in solving this dilemma. One commentator has suggested
that rather than choosing an extreme position-either enforcing all
arbitration agreements or prohibiting arbitration of all federal securi-
ties claims-judicial supervision over the arbitral process would obvi-
ate the concerns of the courts that have refused to permit such
135. See Brief for the American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae, supra note 131,
at 14-15.
136. See Fletcher, supra note 128, at 451.
137. See Brief for the American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae, supra note 131,
at App. B.
138. See Fletcher, supra note 128, at 455.
139. See Katsoris, supra note 129, at 312.
140. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982) ("Even when an
acceptable result is finally achieved in a civil case, that result is often drained of much of its
value because of the time lapse, the expense, and the emotional stress inescapable in the
litigation process.").
141. See Fletcher, supra note 128, at 458.
142. See Katsoris, supra note 129, at 290-91.
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arbitration.' 43 In particular, judicial supervision of the arbitrator
selection process is imperative to ensure that a knowledgeable, impar-
tial person (or panel) presides over the hearing.
Chief Justice Burger noted in an address to the American Bar
Association that "arbitration should be an alternative that will com-
plement the judicial systems. There will always be conflicts which
cannot be settled except by the judicial process."'" He added, how-
ever, that "[t]here are important advantages in private arbitration of
large, complex commercial disputes."' 45
V. Wilko v. Swan TACITLY OVERRULED
In Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court determined that compel-
ling arbitration of a dispute arising under section 12(2) of the 1933
Act would constitute a waiver of the plaintiff's rights in violation of
section 14.146 The Court based its conclusion primarily on the
assumption that a plaintiff's substantive rights were not protected
adequately by arbitration.'4 7 In addition to the 1933 Act's antiwaiver
provision, the Wilko Court noted the absence of any scienter require-
ment in section 12(2) of the Act, and that the Act gave plaintiffs
broad discretion to choose a forum.' 48 The Wilko Court reasoned
that these features of the 1933 Act created a "special right" which
arbitration could not protect adequately.
Because the 1934 Act provides an implied cause of action, rather
than the express cause of action found in the 1933 Act, Justice White
had argued in his Byrd concurrence that the Court should not
"mechanically transplant" the Wilko doctrine into the 1934 Act. 149
In fact, many observers had assumed that if the Supreme Court
143. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims.- The Need for Enhanced
Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219 (1986). Allison concludes
his article by quoting Jerome Frank:
The judge, at his best, is an arbitrator, a "sound man" who strives to do justice to
the parties by exercising a wise discretion with reference to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. . . . The bench and bar usually try to conceal the
arbitral function of the judge .... But although fear of legal uncertainty leads to
this concealment, the arbitral function is the central fact in the administration of
justice. The concealment has merely made the labor of judges less effective.
Id. at 275-76 (quoting J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 157 (1930)).
144. Burger, supra note 140, at 277. But see Bayer & Abrahams, The Trouble with
Arbitration, 11 LITIG. 30, 32 (Winter 1985) ("Arbitration aims at resolving disputes quickly
and finally. It does that, but at a cost you may not want to pay.").
145. Id.
146. 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 435-36; see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
148. Id. at 431; see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
149. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring).
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approved arbitration of 1934 Act claims, it would base its refusal on
this express/implied distinction.15 ° The SEC, however, urged the
Court not to distinguish between express and implied causes of action
in its McMahon decision, reasoning that "[s]ection 10(b) is just as
much a 'provision' of the 1934 Act, with which persons trading in
securities are required to 'comply,' as Section 12(2) is of the 1933
Act."'' Apparently, the SEC persuaded the Court on this point
because the majority in McMahon never mentioned the express/
implied distinction, which Justice Blackmun noted in his dissenting
opinion: "That the Court passes over the [express/implied distinc-
tion] in silence, although petitioners have advanced it, . . . would
appear to relegate that argument to its proper place in the graveyard
of ideas."'
512
The McMahon Court's refusal to make a distinction between the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act resulted in a decision that directly con-
flicted with its Wilko holding. The McMahon Court resolved this
conflict by qualifying Wilko: "Wilko must be understood, therefore,
as holding that the plaintiff's waiver of the 'right to select judicial
forum' . . . was unenforceable only because arbitration was judged
inadequate to enforce the statutory rights created by § 12(2)."' m The
Court then foreshadowed Wilko's demise by acknowledging the vast
improvement in the arbitral process since the Wilko decision. In fact,
the Court admitted that:
[T]he mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko
opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitra-
tion that has prevailed since that time. This is especially so in light
of the intervening changes in the regulatory structure of the securi-
ties laws. Even if Wilko's assumptions regarding arbitration were
valid at the time Wilko was decided, most certainly they do not
150. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 7, Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (No.
86-44) [hereinafter Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae].
151. Id. at 24. The SEC also argued that:
[T]he Commission urges the Court not to premise its decision in this case on a
distinction between express and implied remedies. That distinction is irrelevant
to the proper analysis of the case and is incompatible with the importance of the
Section 10(b) remedy in the arsenal of securities law protections. There is, in
addition, an important practical consideration. Any reliance on such a
distinction might be interpreted as suggesting that the Section 10(b) implied right
of action is somehow inferior to express rights. The Commission urges the Court
to avoid any suggestion that might thus interfere with the effective enforcement
of the securities laws.
Id. at 26.
152. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2347 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2338 (citations omitted) (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
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hold true today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC's
oversight authority.' 54
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun went one step
beyond the majority. He asserted that the McMahon decision "effec-
tively overrule[d] Wilko by accepting the Securities and Exchange
Commission's newly adopted position that arbitration procedures...
have improved greatly since Wilko was decided."' 55
One may ponder, What is left of the Wilko doctrine? This Note
suggests that the answer is-nothing.
VI. CONCLUSION
By passing the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, Congress man-
dated that the judiciary honor the express desire of private parties to
use arbitration as an alternative to litigation. Even though judicial
hostility toward arbitration may have been understandable at one
time, arbitration procedures have improved tremendously due to the
supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission 5 6 and the
development of strict procedural guidelines, such as those established
by the American Arbitration Association. 5 7 These improvements
obviate the need for judicial paternalism. As a general rule, courts
should honor arbitration agreements, unless Congress has created a
specific exemption to the FAA in a given statute.'58
154. Id. at 2341; see also Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1039 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) ("Were I writing
on a clean slate, I might well be inclined to reach a result contrary to the Wilko Court.").
155. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For the proposition that
McMahon overruled Wilko, see Noble v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 850
n.3 (5th Cir. 1987) ("McMahon undercuts every aspect of Wilko; a formal overruling of Wilko
appears inevitable-or, perhaps, superfluous."); Drazdik v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., No. 86-
3336 at n.1 (6th Cir. July 17, 1987) ("[W]e note that McMahon has cast considerable doubt
over Wilko's continuing validity."); Staiman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
No. CV 87-1057 RSWL(Gx) (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1987). But see Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219 (2d
Cir. 1987); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Express, Inc., No. 85-115-I-MAC
(M.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 1987); Continental Serv. Life & Health Insur. Co. v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. La. 1987).
156. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, supra note
150. In addition to the improvements discussed in the SEC Brief, the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration, in response to McMahon, recently recommended further revisions
to arbitration procedures "to ensure that 'public' arbitrators do not have significant
professional ties to the [securities] industry." SEC Staff to Urge Revisions, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1387 (Sept. 18, 1987).
157. See Brief for the American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae, supra note 131.
In addition to the improvements discussed in the AAA Brief, the AAA recently released a new
set of rules in response to McMahon "meant to give investors and brokers an improved avenue
for arbitration that is more independent of the securities industry than arbitration carried out
by the securities exchanges." AAA Releases New Arbitration Rules, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1392 (Sept. 18, 1987).
158. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
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In McMahon, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to
announce what it had been hinting for a long time: Nothing in the
language of RICO or the 1934 Act evinces the requisite congressional
intent to create an exception to the FAA. Although the 1934 Act
prohibits a waiver of substantive compliance with the Act, a predis-
pute arbitration agreement affects only procedural alternatives and
does not involve a waiver of substantive compliance. 5 9 Furthermore,
the Court unanimously held that RICO does not even come close to
creating an exception to the FAA. 6 ° Courts must now enforce arbi-
tration agreements between parties involved in 1934 Act or RICO
disputes.
Finally, it is clear that Wilko's "swan song" has begun to sound.
The McMahon decision represents the culmination of a series of cases
in which the Supreme Court undertook a piecemeal dismantling of
the Wilko doctrine.' 6 ' Assuming that Congress does not step in and
amend the securities laws to prohibit arbitration of securities
claims, 6 2 predispute arbitration agreements will soon be enforceable
even if a plaintiff asserts a 1933 Act claim. In fact, one federal district
court has already reached such a holding.1 63 It is inevitable that a
conflict will develop between the circuits over the continued vitality of
Wilko, and litigants will ask the Supreme Court to consider the Wilko
doctrine one last time. At that time, the Court most assuredly will
retire Wilko to its proper place in the "graveyard of ideas."
1 64
F. CHET TAYLOR
159. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 118-125 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 61-97 and accompanying text.
162. According to a recent article in the Miami Review, "Congress is planning to hold
hearings on the McMahon decision later this year to consider whether the federal securities
laws should be amended to limit or overrule the effects of McMahon." Gard, McMahon
Decision Recognizes Advances in Arbitration, Miami Review, Sept. 14, 1987, at 11, col. 1.
163. See Staiman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. CV 87-1057
RSWL(Gx) (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1987) ("McMahon held that an arbitration held pursuant to...
NYSE procedures did not effect a waiver of the 1934 Act. A similar conclusion is compelled
for claims under the 1933 Act.") (citation omitted).
164. See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2347 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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